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Abstract
This article examines comparative homicide rates in the United States
and Western Europe in an era of increasingly globalized neoliberal
economics. The main finding of this preliminary analysis is that
historical and spatial correlations between distinct forms of political
economy and homicide rates are consistent enough to suggest that
social democratic regimes are more successful at fostering the socio-
cultural conditions necessary for reduced homicide rates. Thus
Western Europe and all continents and nations should approach the
importation of American neo-liberal economic policies with extreme
caution. The article concludes by suggesting that the indirect but
crucial causal connection between political economy and homicide
rates, prematurely pushed into the background of criminological
thought during the ‘cultural turn’, should be returned to the foreground.
Introduction
This article aims to draw attention to correlations between homicide rates
and divergent forms of capitalist political economy. However, we must
commence by making three points to clarify our basic definitions. Firstly, we are
concerned primarily with variations in the form of capitalist political economy, that
is, formal differences in the regulatory relationships between the State, civil
society and the economy and not simply the boom–recession ‘business cycle’ of
economic performance or the political colours of parties in office. As we shall see,
in the industrialized West the most striking distinction in homicide rates can be
found between, on one hand, the American neo-liberal form, and on the other the
social democratic and corporatist forms that, although currently under pressure
from the global hegemony of neo-liberalism, still characterize Western European
nations.
Secondly, we will not concern ourselves with political, state-sponsored or
institutionalized killing, which are complex issues with their own specific literature
and potential solutions (see Green and Ward, 2004; Ruggiero, 2006). Their
inclusion would significantly increase overall homicide rates. For instance, were
we to factor in capital punishment and war-deaths, the USA would display a rate
of killing far higher than that indicated by official homicide statistics. Something
similar would occur if we were to view the rates of killing in 20th-century Europe
through the prisms of both World Wars, the Holocaust and capital punishment in
the period before its abolition. Adding the further lens of deaths caused by
governmental/ corporate crime and negligence would complicate the matter even
further (see Tombs and Slapper , 1999). However, our purpose here is to
compare variations in the spatial and temporal patterns of legally defined interper-
sonal homicide that characterize two specific forms of capitalist economy. Thus
we will focus on statistical trends of recorded incidents within territories governed
by sovereign states.
Thirdly, we are aware of the standard problems one encounters when using
official statistics (see Reiner, 2007: 44–75). Speaking of ‘homicide’ as a uniform
concept does indeed represent as a generalized abstraction of what in reality is a
concatenation of diverse concrete acts, meanings and motivations (see Ferrell et
al., 2004). We are also aware of the tendency of cultural differences to vary the
way definitions and recorded incidents of crime are socially constructed in
different nations and regions, which makes comparative studies rather difficult.
However ‘homicide’, which combines murder with manslaughter and infanticide,
is the concept most useful for making valid cross-cultural comparisons in the
impossibly complex noumenal reality of human killing. According to Barclay and
Tavares (2000: 3), ‘since the definition of homicide is similar in most countries,
absolute comparisons of rates are possible’. Murder, of course, is a complex and
slippery legal concept. Definitions can range from an act motivated by ‘malice
aforethought’ and intent to kill, an act displaying ‘reckless indifference to life’ or a
killing committed in the course of committing another inherently dangerous crime.
Definitions of murder vary according to nations’ different cultural norms and penal
codes, but because the broader term ‘homicide’ includes all murders alongside
other malum in se crimes such as manslaughter and criminal homicide caused by
negligence and recklessness, the way it is defined and statistically recorded is
similar across all the nations discussed in this study.
This broader concept ‘sweeps up’ most incidents of criminalized interpersonal
killing, including those which in some nations or regions might not have been
included in the murder statistics. Whereas complex culturo-legal differences
prevent us from making convincing statistical comparisons of murder rates in
Western Europe and the USA, comparisons of homicide rates are not perfect but
certainly far more useful. Indeed, in the qualitative dimension, many previous
studies have suggested that wherever neoliberalism dominates a nation to
destabilize the economy and atomize the society, we find a far more aggressive,
‘harder’ competitive-individualist culture that increases anomie, narcissism,
interpersonal hostility and punitiveness (see Hallsworth, 2005; Reiner, 2007; Hall
et al., 2008). Therefore, rather than restrict our focus to premeditated murders, it
is important to use a broader concept which includes killings that might well be
related to the explosion in general crime and the unsupportive and chaotic
conditions of existence engendered by neo-liberalism (see Currie, 1997; Dorling,
2004; Reiner, 2007). However, we need to avoid very broad concepts such as
‘assault’, ‘wounding’ or ‘serious violence’, which are so culturally nuanced,
diverse and contested as to be unmanageable in a short study such as this. For
that purpose, and for the purpose of cross-cultural comparison, ‘homicide’ is
currently the best that is available to us.
Our intention is to comment upon temporal and spatial patterns of homicide rates
in relation to shifting politico-economic forms. Previous statistical analyses
demonstrate quite clearly that, in terms of geographical concentration, personal
circumstances and individual motivations, a significant majority of homicides are
at least in a correlative sense strongly connected to the socio-economic structure.
For instance, over the past two decades annual homicide rates in economically
impoverished British and US locales have been up to six times the national
averages; up to 10 times if age and ethnicity were also to be taken into account
(Zimring and Hawkins, 1997; Dorling, 2004). On closer inspection, if we look at a
simple breakdown (US Department of Justice, 2005a), without denying the
uniqueness of each event it is still quite clear that circumstances and motivations
do not seem to be unfathomably diverse. In the USA in 2005, in the category of
homicides committed in the course of committing other crimes in known circum-
stances, economically driven crimes, such as robbery, burglary and so on,
outnumbered others, such as sexual crimes and arson, by 1693 to 90, or about
19 to 1. In the other main category of homicides unrelated to other crimes,
circumstances usually associated with life in downtown areas, such as escalated
arguments, gang killings and drug-related violence, outnumbered other
circumstances, such as child and intimate partner homicides, by 4970 to 157, or
about 32 to 1. It thus seems quite likely that over 90 per cent of US homicides in
known circumstances can be associated in one way or another with economic
motivations and/or situations and locales defined principally by their
disadvantaged positions in the socio-economic structure.
This relationship between the capitalist economy, crime and punishment has
been discussed for quite some time. Most introductory textbooks discuss the
familiar statistical surveys carried out in Western Europe in the 19th century.
However, it is a little-known criminological fact that the revolutionary Rosa
Luxemburg (1951 [1913]) conducted a statistical survey of violent crime in
Germany. This rather contrived yet enlightening effort to highlight the tendency of
capitalism and religion to foster and reproduce aggressive human relationships
showed higher rates of violence in ‘traditional’ regions dominated by right-wing
politics and in the throes of disruption by industrial capitalism. The far less
revolutionary British historian R.H. Tawney, in his celebrated work The
Acquisitive Society, warned of the socially deleterious and potentially
criminogenic psychocultural effects of the competitive individualism that
characterizes the capitalist free market economy, which:
suspends a golden prize, which not all can attain, but for which each may strive,
the enchanting vision of infinite expression. It assures men that there are no ends
other than their ends, no law other than their desires, no limit other than that
which they think advisable. Thus it makes the individual the centre of his own
universe, and dissolves moral principles into a choice of expediencies.
(Tawney, 1961 [1921]: 33)
Subsequent well-known works might include those of the Dutch criminologist
Willem Bonger (1969 [1916]) in the early 20th century, in the midst of la belle
époque, the opulent yet unstable ‘free-trade’ era. He claimed that the fragile
capitalist economy and its unequal structure of social relations engendered
conditions of egoism and demoralization that were inherently criminogenic.
Because he was quite clear about the importance of cultural mediation, his
formulations were certainly less ‘mechanically deterministic’ than the ‘new
criminologists’ of the early 1970s suggested (see Reiner, 2007; Hall et al., 2008).
Rusche and Kirchheimer (1939) made a similar claim a little later, also
emphasizing capitalism’s tendency to develop economically functional
punishment systems that discriminated heavily against the working class. During
the post-war era Robert Merton (1957) and numerous Mertonian-influenced
criminologists (see Downes, 1966; Karstedt and Farrall, 2006; Messner and
Rosenfeld, 2007) emphasized the inherent dissonance between capitalism’s
heady and seductive cultural aspirations and its structured socio-economic reality
of unequal opportunities, which engendered an anomic and therefore
criminogenic cultural climate.
The Mertonians stopped short of the sweeping claim that capitalism was
inherently criminogenic, arguing instead that unequal opportunities can be
remedied by governmental policy. The claim that capitalism per se was
simultaneously criminogenic and punitive was often used by more radically
inclined criminologists to bolster the argument for accelerating the anticipated
revolutionary change to a socialist society (see Greenberg, 1981; Taylor, 1981).
However, as ‘actually existing’ socialism in the East collapsed in the 1980s, the
socialist Left also suffered heavy political and ideological defeats across the
industrialized West (Taylor, 1999). Thus the clamour surrounding this
criminogenic relationship died down somewhat, but it was revived in the early
1990s as the homicide and violent crime rates yet again rose alarmingly in the
USA (see Figure 1; also Hagan, 1994; Zimring and Hawkins, 1997). In a rigorous
attempt to revive social democratic principles, Elliot Currie (1997) suggested that
the investigation of violence and the political approach to its reduction would be
better served if criminologists shifted attention away from the revolutionary
transformation of the Marxian economic base as well as the alternative micro-
interventions in interpersonal relations and individual psychology. It would be
more useful, he argued, to focus on the problematic yet more politically tractable
sociocultural conditions of the ‘mid-range’; increasingly polarized social inequality,
the erosion of community and informal networks of control, the fragmentation of
family, the withdrawal of welfare support and the competitive individualist culture
of Darwinian brutality. All these conditions, he argued, were inevitable features of
the lightly regulated neo-liberal variant of the capitalist market economy.
This argument was in many ways similar to that of the British Left Realists. With
notable exceptions (see for instance Lea, 2002), they had resigned themselves to
the failure of political macro-intervention and suggested their own ‘mid-range’
targets of intervention: the complex relationships between the State, the public,
the victim and the offender represented by the well-known ‘square of crime’ (see
Young and Matthews, 1992). For both Currie and the Left Realists, capitalism’s
competitive individualist culture and exploitative economic relations still
constituted the broad aetiological bedrock of violent crime. However, realistically,
the targets of intervention should be shifted to the more tractable ‘mid-range’,
where political systems of democracy, citizenship and economic regulation
combine with cultural systems of morality to mediate and control the capitalist
economy’s often anarchic and brutal dynamism. This heavily diluted reformist
approach expects standard liberal-democratic systems of mid-range political
intervention to underpin complex configurations of formal and informal micro-
management in an effort to reduce violent crime in increasingly unstable
economic and social macro-contexts. However, for us this ignores the copious
empirical evidence of the success of European economic macro-intervention,
which operates at a deeper and more fundamental level to stabilize economy and
society and maintain low rates of violence, especially homicide, alongside low
rates of imprisonment (Cavadino and Dignan, 2006; Reiner, 2007). To support
this argument, we will emphasize what many radical criminologists gave scant
attention to; the stark differences in homicide rates to be found in the two distinct
‘capitalisms’ that continue to dominate the industrialized West: the US free-
market model and the Western European social democratic models.
In post-war Western Europe, programmes of mid-range intervention were
implemented on the firm bedrock of genuine socio-economic macro-intervention
managed by various forms of social democratic state. Although some Anglo-
American criminological theorists have now suggested that this approach might
be obsolete (see, for instance, Young, 1999,2007), the Western European
homicide rate, as we shall see presently, remains significantly lower than that of
the USA, a situation maintained alongside far lower imprisonment rates
(Cavadino and Dignan, 2006). Thus we will contend that continuing to examine
the problem of violence through the lenses of micro and meso approaches
ignores the elephant that continues to stand obdurately in the room. In some
intellectual quarters it has become increasingly unfashionable to question the
legitimacy and the inevitability of the deregulated free-market economic system
currently engulfing our planet, and even more unfashionable to support either
organized political resistance or deep state regulation. Indeed, as Boltanski and
Chiapello (2007) remarked recently, the term ‘capitalism’, along with its critique,
have virtually disappeared from the mainstream social scientific lexicon.
Nevertheless, we will argue that there is a good deal of evidence to support the
view still put forward by some criminologists (see Dorling, 2004; Reiner, 2006,
2007) that the essential nature of this American model of capitalism is
irredeemably criminogenic and prone to a relatively high homicide rate. This
situation contrasts starkly with a potentially sustainable decrease in societies that
have embraced the assortment of Western European social democratic or ‘social
market’ models that, at least up to now, have been unified by their ability to
stabilize their economies and social relations.
Plural capitalism
Neither North America nor Europe has ever exhibited a homogenous form of
capitalism; rather it would be more appropriate to talk in the plural of ‘capitalisms’
(Gray, 2002; Hutton, 2002; Todd, 2004; Cavadino and Dignan, 2006). The
political macro-context of our analysis—which relies on the claim that nation-
states and their various politico-cultural traditions have the ability to ‘customize’
market capitalism’s basic economic form—will undoubtedly be contested in many
quarters. For example, early hyper-globalists such as Ohmae (1990, 1993)
argued that the nation-state will surely die in the relentless process of
globalization. However, later sceptics such as Hirst and Thompson (1996) and
Gray (2002) argued that the intensity of today’s economic transformation pales
into insignificance compared to the belle époque of pre-1914. During this time, as
Karl Polanyi (1944) noted, global trade and labour flows were much greater than
those we witness today, yet the nation- state prevailed in spectacular forms. More
recently, a number of commentators have converged around the idea that
globalization does not necessarily imply a move towards economic, political and
cultural homogeneity (see Held and McGrew, 2007). Nations, their
anthropological cultures and their state apparatuses differ greatly across the
globe in their respective forms of economic organization and methods of political
governance, and so far these differences are being quite successfully maintained
(Gray 2002:55–6; Cavadino and Dignan, 2006).
The culturo-political traditions contained within the world’s nation- states seem to
be more diverse and durable than was once thought during the heyday of
modernity. It seems possible that unless the current round of regulation mooted
at recent conferences in the wake of the global credit- crunch fails and the
inherently unstable global capitalist system is driven to meltdown by resource
depletion, rising prices and financial failure—in which case we will find ourselves
in an unprecedented scenario with potentially grave cultural, political and
criminogenic consequences—some of the various historical strands of capitalist
politico-economic development might, with the aid of resolute political will, survive
and develop throughout the 21st century. These strands include, among others,
the ‘Washington consensus’, ‘residual welfare regimes’, ‘social democracy’,
‘Catholic corporatism’ and, most recently, China’s fascinating and rather daunting
model of rapid market-driven industrialization governed by a quasi-Leninist state
(see Naughton, 2007). Equally, we cannot contend that there is a single
‘European’ social market model. As Hutton (2002: 326–40) reminds us, there are
also many variations of the European capitalist welfare state, ranging from the
Rhineland model of Germany, Austria and the Netherlands and the Catholic
paternalism found in southern Europe to Nordic social democracy. Added to this
mix are the French and British models, with the former placing a heavy onus on
state support, while the latter is ‘the economy and society regarded as nearest in
Europe to the American model’ (Hutton, 2002: 337; see also McLean and
Patterson, 2006; Patterson and McLean, 2008). On balance, the suspiciously
ideological notion that the globalizing free market and its accompanying
hegemony will inevitably dissipate the authority and potential for political choice
held by the world’s nation-states appears to be rather disingenuous.
The politico-cultural organization of capitalist markets across the globe is widely
variegated and seems likely to remain so. However, when it comes down to the
primary interface between the political, the economic and the social, there seem
to be two basic forms of capitalist development in the industrialized West: the
neo-liberal ‘Washington consensus’ variant of the Anglo- Saxon model, and the
social democratic model of north-western continental Europe, of which all other
European models, even the more conservative Catholic corporatist models of the
South, are cultural variants. These contrasting forms of neo-liberal and social
democratic capitalist organization have also been referred to as hyperliberalism
and state capitalism (Cox, 1996: 30–1), and the differences between them are
quite fundamental. The latter is characterized by state administered socio-
economic management in partnership with capitalist industry, whereas the former
is characterized by laissez-faire economics, minimal state intervention,
multilateral financial institutions and the resurgence of an oligarchic elite (Harvey,
2005). For thinkers such as Cox (1996: 31), neo-liberalism or hyperliberalism:
in the ideology if not always in the practice of Reaganism and Thatcherism,
rejects state intervention to influence the results of market behaviour and views
the state only as the enforcer of market rules ... The key words in the currently
dominant global ideology are competitiveness, deregulation, privatisation, and
restructuring. Restructuring refers to the reorganisation of global production from
Fordist economies of scale to post-Fordist economies of flexibility. It means fewer
reasonably secure and high-income core workers and a larger proportion of
precariously employed lower-income peripheral workers [and] ... that a large part
of the world’s population exists in deepening poverty, outside the global
economy. Privatisation and deregulation refer to the removal of the state from a
substantive role in the national or global economy, except as guarantor of free
movement for capital and profits. Competitiveness is the justification for
dismantling the welfare states built up in the post-World War II period—negating
the effort in the more industrialised countries to legitimate capitalism by avoiding
a recurrence of the immiseration that occurred during the Great Depression of the
1930s.
Cox’s claim that the social democratic project was instigated simply to ‘legitimize
capitalism’ is perhaps a little too instrumentalist and lacking in dialectical
sophistication, but his description of neo-liberalism and its glaring contrast with
social democracy is very clear. Cultural differences aside, in the midst of the
competitive pressure exerted by a corporate-driven and increasingly aggressive
globalizing economy and the elusiveness of feasible alternatives, European
political leaders are now faced with a stark choice between these two models
(Amin, 2004). The short-term dynamism of the neo-liberal model was until very
recently more attractive to shareholders, financiers and corporate business
leaders, and more adept at establishing technologically advanced
consumer/service economies that can attract inward investment and temporarily
fend off the challenge of the East’s burgeoning low-wage manufacturing centres.
On the other hand, the traditional social-democratic or ‘Rhineland’ model of
political economy ‘is distinguished from the Anglo- Saxon model by its emphasis
on corporate structures that encourage consensus among the principal economic
actors’ (Roberts and Hogwood, 2003: 61). Social democracy’s ability to maintain
socio-economic stability stands in stark contrast to the destabilizing slash-and-
burn capitalism of the Washington consensus, a contrast that, in the wake of the
recent financial collapse, is now reviving the ideological challenge to neo-
liberalism.
This fundamental dichotomy is reflected in starkly and consistently differentiated
homicide rates. These rates actually underwent a sustained decrease across
Western Europe from various points in the Early Modern period to the mid-1960s
(Eisner, 2001), but as social democracy faltered and neo-liberal political
economy, consumer culture and permanent localized recessions took root
(Taylor, 1999; Lea, 2002; Reiner, 2006, 2007), a sustained and uninterrupted rise
occurred for the first time in modern history. As we shall see shortly, a similar
contemporary pattern can be observed on a far larger scale in the USA as it
moved out of the more socially aware and interventionist ‘New Deal’ and ‘Great
Society’ periods into the anarchic economic dynamism of the globalizing,
consumer-driven free-market. There is little doubt that the neo-liberal economy
can generate short-term dynamism in terms of profitability. However, in Western
Europe, up to now, despite some recent political shifts and incidents of public
unrest as relentless pressure is exerted by global markets, neo-liberal ideology
and economic instability (see Young, 2007; Žižek, 2008), social cohesion still
remains significantly stronger.
Consistent social cohesion is undoubtedly not the case in all regions and locales
of the USA. Gray (2002: 217) reminds us that ‘the chronic insecurities of late
modern capitalism, especially in its most virulent free-market variant, corrode
some of the central institutions and values of bourgeois life’. These are precisely
the same institutions and values that Currie (1997) recognized as crucial to the
maintenance of low rates of violence. Perhaps more importantly, the crucial
communal and political institutions of working- class life continue to be corroded,
even more abruptly and completely in areas of permanent localized recession
(Lasch, 1996; Harvey, 2005). This process is also discernable in parts of neo-
liberal Britain (Taylor, 1999; Winlow and Hall, 2006; Hall et al., 2008). At the turn
of the millennium, the neo-liberal Washington consensus and its attendant
cultural forms, which had already infiltrated Britain, had also gained some
popularity across continental Europe, percolating relentlessly through the
mainstream political economy and the commercial mass-media into its cultural
and institutional nooks and crannies. Diverse cultures and politico-economic
models still exist, but economic and ideological pressure is still building up on
social democratic nations, threatening to disrupt their fragile infrastructures. This
means that crucial political choices of a deeper nature than the recapitalization
and light-touch regulation suggested at the recent G20 summit will have to be
made at some point in the near future. However, we contend that the varying
rates and patterns of homicide that seem to be associated with the two
fundamental capitalist models of political economy should be important guiding
factors in the decision-making process.
A historical overview of US and Western European homicide rates
If we wish to establish the possibility of a significant connection between political
economy and homicide, the main question becomes this: do trends in homicide
rates correlate in clearly identifiable relationships with the two principal forms of
political economy described above? In historical terms, statistical representations
of homicide rates in the USA in the 18th and 19th centuries are unreliable
because of poor recording practices in the southern and frontier states and lack
of knowledge about cultural variations in reporting trends (Eckberg, 1995; Lane,
1997). However, historiographical and anecdotal evidence suggests that
throughout this period some of the minimally governed parts of the USA
experienced periods of extreme interpersonal violence (Trachtenberg, 1982;
Slotkin, 1998; van Creveld, 1999). Some commentaries on US homicide trends
emphasize the low national rate of about 1.0 per 100,000 at the turn of the 20th
century, but in an interesting demographic step analysis, Eckberg (1995) exposed
this as a myth.
Figure 1 US homicide rates, 1900–2006
Sources: Eckberg (1995); US Department of Justice (2005b).
This supposed low rate was the result of only a few states with relatively low
individual homicide rates returning death registration data. Had the remaining
states returned their relatively higher rates, he estimates that the national mean
average rate in that period would have been nearer 6.0 per 100,000 in 1901.
Furthermore, if we superimpose a political picture across this analysis, it
becomes quite clear that the states with lower homicide rates in this period were
those in the throes of state-sponsored economic development. States such as
Massachusetts, Michigan, Connecticut, Maine and New Jersey were
characterized by urbanization and manufacturing industries, stable economies
and communities, strong labour movements and advanced state administrations.
The higher-rate latecomers to the analysis, such as Arkansas, Tennessee,
Nevada and Texas, were characterized by precisely the opposite: minimally
regulated and socially divisive antebellum capitalism.
If we include Eckberg’s correction (see Figure 1) it is still quite clear that rates
ascended through the increasingly unstable and socially divisive free- market
1920s to a peak of 9.7 per 100,000 in 1933 during the Great Depression. This
contrasts with significant decreases in 1937 and 1938 as the social democratic
‘Second New Deal’ project stabilized the economy and its working communities.
However, Eckberg’s correction also demonstrates quite clearly that the social
democratic era was not a poor statist substitute for a lost cultural ‘golden age’ at
the turn of the century. Rather, it seems to be a significant improvement during
which the USA experienced what might well be its historically lowest annual
homicide rates. Rates in the revived social democratic project in the early 1960s
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US homicide rates per 100,000 Eckberg’s correction
were also lower than those of the more traditional society at the turn of the 20th
century. In fact, by 1958, when consensus government and Keynesian
economics existed alongside a stable Fordist economy in the post-war
reconstruction era, the rate had been reduced to 4.6. It remained low and roughly
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Figure 2 US homicide and imprisonment rates, 1900–2006 Sources: US
Department of Justice (2005b, 2005c).
constant throughout the 1950s, and did not climb above 5.0 until 1960, before
falling back to under 5.0 the following year.
It hovered around this mark until 1965, when it reached 5.1 per 100,000, and then
rose steadily thereafter, with alarming spikes in 1980 and 1991, before beginning
a decline in the late 199 0s. However, this decline correlated with an intense
period of mass incarceration and increased surveillance of ‘problem populations’
(Cavadino and Dignan, 2006). During the 1990s the Clinton administration was
determined to lower the homicide rate, and ‘[b]etween 1995 and 2001, the
increasing number of violent offenders accounted for 63% of the total growth of
the State prison population’ (US Department of Justice, 2005c). There does seem
to be some truth in the notion that the increased incapacitation of violent
offenders, heavy-handed ‘zero tolerance policing’ and the expansion of
surveillance, supervision and risk-management strategies by criminal justice
agencies correlate with a significant reduction of the US homicide rate (see
Figure 2). This can be asserted without denying the accompanying truth that a
huge number of minor offenders are imprisoned unnecessarily in an overly
punitive ‘culture of control’ (Garland, 2001; Cavadino and Dignan, 2006).
However, the undeniable role played by the incarceration of violent offenders
does nothing to convince onlookers that the reduction in the homicide rate had
anything to do with bogus, credit-based Clintonite ‘prosperity’ or improvements in
social justice, social cohesion and interpersonal relationships in the USA’s
troubled locales (Hall, 2002). Figure 2 also demonstrates quite clearly that the
politics of the social democratic era, which stretched from the mid-1930s to the
US homicide rate per 100,000 US prison population per 1000
late 1960s, were capable of maintaining a reduced homicide rate alongside a low
imprisonment rate.
Until the late 1960s, when the homicide rate entered a steep climb, American
social life was still administered by a residual welfare system initiated by the New
Deal, which, although officially created by Roosevelt in 1933 to drag the USA out
of the Great Depression, was also in part a response to pressure exerted by
vocal working-class political movements from a strong bargaining position (Zinn,
1980). The New Deal programmes ended officially in 1943, but, although the
resulting welfare system was limited in comparison to those of Western Europe,
in the post-war years it still continued to provide a minimal social safety net for
disadvantaged Americans. Post-war reconstruction also generated a boom in
manufacturing; working- class communities that had suffered during the
Depression era were rejuvenated, and new ones were created. From 1963 to
1969, Kennedy’s ‘New Frontier’ and Johnson’s ‘Great Society’ programmes
focused on education, health, community development and transportation rather
than deep economic regulation and the further expansion of welfare and job
creation, but, nevertheless, they retained at least to some extent basic social
democratic principles at the heart of American politics. For the first time in the
USA’s history, most communities across its industrial conurbations and rural
heartlands experienced a heightened degree of stability. A population that had for
four-and-a-half centuries been constantly on the move, seeking opportunities to
acquire property and increase personal wealth in a difficult and often hostile
environment, settled down to a set of socio-economic interdependencies that—
despite huge tensions and gaps in equality across the axes of class, race and
gender—were relatively stable. This stability provided a helpful platform for hope,
political organization and the subsequent emancipatory leaps forward in the civil
rights of Afro-Americans, women and gays in the 1960s and 1970s. Long chains
of socio-economic interdependencies were stabilized. This is probably the most
crucial factor in the ‘civilizing process’ that Norbert Elias (1994 [1939]) placed at
the centre of violence reduction in western history. Yet, it is the one that is
systematically ignored by some of the less theoretically sophisticated
commentators on historical patterns of murder rates, who prefer to focus on the
other two factors, the State’s monopolization of violence and shifting
cultural/behavioural codes (see for instance Spierenburg, 2008), which allows for
a rather unthinking celebration of modernity and liberal individualism while
avoiding the requirement for more sophisticated analyses that seek to integrate
culture and statecraft with political economy and social relations. However, the
tight correlation between stable economic functions and the ability of political and
cultural institutions to help to maintain social interdependencies, as we can see
quite clearly here, adds weight to the criticism that Elias’s rather over-simplified
and apolitical thesis tended to neglect political economy as the crucial platform for
stabilizing society and reducing interpersonal hostility (Fletcher, 1997; Hall and
Winlow, 2003; Hall, 2007).
The late 1960s was an era of heightened racial tensions and cultural change. Yet
it would be folly to blame the beginning of a long-term increase in the homicide
rate on purely racial factors, or indeed the moral ‘permissiveness’ that flourished
during this period, or even the legitimation crisis of a state that had thrust the
USA into an un-winnable war in Vietnam. Political upheaval, racial tensions,
institutional racism, hedonism and sexual liberation also characterized Western
Europe at the same time, yet homicide rates remained low (see Figure 2). The
most profound difference is, however, quite banal and obvious. In the period that
began in the late 1960s, alongside the rising expectations of prosperity and
personal freedom promoted by consumer culture and the so-called ‘cultural
revolution’—which some now regard as a bogus product of the marketing industry
(see Hall et al., 2008, for a discussion)—the dark clouds of a gathering economic
crisis based on overproduction, global competition and rising oil prices loomed on
the horizon of the industrialized West. In the ensuing storm European nations
tried very hard to stabilize their manufacturing bases, retain their social demo-
cratic models and support their working communities. However, in a process that
began tentatively under Nixon and slipped into top gear during the ‘Reaganomics’
regime, the USA followed more immediately and more closely the economic
dictates of neo-liberalism. Deregulated markets, industrial rationalization and
closure, a systematic assault on working-class political organization and tax-
breaks for the wealthy were all overseen by a minimal- punitive state that
decreased welfare as it increased punishment and surveillance. In the 198 0s the
nation underwent a transformation that tore asunder the regime of quasi-welfare
and economic management that had been instigated during its brief social
democratic era.
We must understand here that US economic regulation differed to that of Western
Europe. The former was essentially a moderately enhanced welfare programme
loosely bolted on to a free-market economy with a minimal degree of Keynesian
demand management. The latter, however, was an integrated system based
upon cradle-to-grave welfare provision in conjunction with deep economic
regulation and nationalization of many major industries and services.
Commitment to the social democratic model was always weaker in the USA,
where entrenched sentiments of anti-statism reside on both ends of its political
spectrum. This made it much easier for the Reagan government to usher in a
purist revival of traditional American economic liberalism. The traditional
‘bourgeois state’ could indulge in punishment, surveillance and militarism on
behalf of the business elite while the positive role that it is capable of playing in
the everyday socio-economic lives of its citizens was severely restricted (Hall and
Winlow, 2003). Legitimized by public fear of the actuality of rising crime and
violence—exaggerated, of course, by the mass media—US incarceration
underwent a sharp rise during the increasingly unstable years of the Reagan
Presidency, a rise that has been sustained throughout the neo-liberal project to
the present day (see Figure 2).
If one believes the core neo-liberal tenet that unfettered free-market capitalism
invariably increases the prosperity, liberty and happiness of all individuals, then
one could be forgiven for thinking that a rising level of wealth and opportunities to
earn money automatically equates with a reduction in violent crime. If anything,
however, the reverse was true. From 1971 to 1995, the homicide rate in the USA
consistently topped 8.0 per 100,000 (US Department of Justice, 2005b). It spiked
up alarmingly in specific geographical locales of permanent recession in the
1980s and early 1990s, where it regularly topped 40 per 100,000, occasionally
reaching the astonishing heights of over 100 per 100,000 for young black males
(Zimring and Hawkins, 1997), many of whom throughout US history have been
consistently discriminated against, consigned to the bottom end of the labour
market and restricted to marginal economic activity (Wilson, 1996). Prosperity
and the market’s narrow form of ‘efficiency’ (see Messner and Rosenfeld, 2007),
therefore, did not correlate with a general reduction in the homicide rate or the
crime rate in general (Hagan, 1994). Rather, in a nation where the distribution of
wealth was the most polarized in the industrialized West, it correlated tightly with
significant increases across the nation and notably greater increases in specific
geographical locales. A remarkable, virtually unprecedented criminological
phenomenon occurred during the unstable era of Reaganomics; a rash of
workplace and school revenge shootings, which, virtually unknown before 1980,
burgeoned from that date onwards to reach a peak in the early 2000s. The
immense pressure placed on workers and school students in the downsizing,
hyper-rationalized and insecure economy was creating unprecedented levels of
interpersonal hatred and hostility, manifested in numerous acts of violent revenge
among those humiliated by ultra-competitive and oppressive associates in work
and educational institutions (see Ames, 2007).
This contrasts quite sharply with the European experience. Until very recently,
Europe had experienced a long-term relationship of inverse proportionality
between its homicide rates and the development of various inclusionist socio-
economic models. As Eisner (2001: 618) reminds us, ‘homicide rates have
declined in Europe over several centuries’. In the five Western European regions
of the British Isles, the Netherlands/Belgium, Scandinavia, Germany/Switzerland
and Italy, where recording practices in earlier centuries were advanced compared
to the USA, rates began to decline in the early 17th century, continuing on a
downward trajectory to the mid- 1960s (see Figure 3). In some nations, such as
England and Wales, the beginning of this decline can be traced back to the late
14th century (Gurr, 1981). The inclusionist ethos that developed during this long
era—even though its underlying economic purposes were instrumental (Hall,
2007)—consolidated itself during the industrial revolution, developing through
customary philanthropy, charity and ‘poor law’ practices to undergo a sweeping
centralization process at the beginning of the 20th century (Garland, 1985). After
the Second World War, it flourished across the whole continent in an
unprecedented redistributive and interventionist form. Even though the British
welfare state in its earlier 19th-century institutionalized guise of the Workhouse
and the Asylum was brutal to say the least (Melossi and Pavarini, 1981), after the
Gladstone Report in 1895 it did tentatively begin to reform and humanize its
practices to offer citizens at least some degree of social protection against the
insecurity of the labour market.
However, the British welfare state was never entirely dependent on this sort of
institutionalization. With the introduction of the decarceration movement and
provisions such as national insurance and pension schemes— initiated by early
20th-century liberals and bolstered further by democratic socialist politics after the
Second World War—it moved towards a form of increasingly de-institutionalized
universal welfare. Admittedly this was haphazard at first, and by no means did it
measure up to the egalitarian ideals of British socialists. Nevertheless, by 1948 it
had been formalized as a relatively successful stabilizing mechanism by a Labour
government that had gained the respect of the working population by enhancing
social justice as it led the nation out of the ravages of the Depression and the
Second World War. Tax-funded education, health services and a universal state
pension, operating on the crucial stable bedrock of a politically managed mixed
economy wherein most major industries and utilities had been nationalized,
formed the basis of the social consensus from that date until 1979. With national
variations, this pattern was mirrored in continental Europe with the rise of
systems such as Rhineland capitalism in post-1945 Germany and the
continuation of the Scandinavian welfare state. In the 1950s and early 1960s
Western European homicide rates were the lowest ever recorded (Eisner, 2001;
Reiner, 2007).
But then something went wrong. Taking into account national and regional
variations of the time-scale, homicide rates had fallen consistently in Britain, the
Netherlands and Belgium, Scandinavia, Germany and Switzerland, and Italy
between the 14th century and various points in the late 1960s. From that point
onwards they actually increased (Eisner, 2001: 629; see Figure 3). Why?
Immigration and ‘cultural permissiveness’ had been common features of many of
these nations since the mid-1950s, and capital punishment had been abolished at
various points on a time-scale that stretched from 1857 (Portugal) to 2004
(Greece), so as direct causes these standard reactionary explanations hold little
water. However, common themes that affected all five regions from the late
1960s were impending economic crises, entry into a competitive, globalizing
market, attenuation and destabilization of manufacturing bases, the increasing
popularity of neo-liberal ideology and politics among the political and business
elites, rising unemployment, social polarization and the intensification of hyper-
individualized consumer culture at the expense of traditional working-class
identities (Lea, 2002; Hall and Winlow, 2005; Hallsworth, 2005; Reiner, 2007; Hall
et al., 2008). OPEC’s quadrupling of oil prices in 1973 and the rise of competitive
manufacturing in other parts of the world created profitability problems and
economic instability in the West. This signalled the decline of the post-war
Keynesian consensus, which was founded on the basic principle of the gradually
democratizing state rejecting its traditional punitive ‘nightwatchman’ role to
become the interventionist macro-manager of both economic dynamism and
social stability. As these problems intensified in the 1970s recessions occurred
across the western world and unemployment rose alongside inflation. In the late
1970s, in what was regarded as a major crisis of the capitalist economy—a
potential ‘epic recession’—the ascendancy of neo-liberal ideas finally consigned
Keynesian economics to the grave. For the majority, who equated progress and
human happiness with profitability, prosperity and economic growth, the legiti-
macy of social democratic governance was severely damaged.
Echoing the rise of ‘free-market’ ideology in the USA, the Thatcher Government
embarked upon a grand project of introducing slash and burn neo-liberal
economics into Britain. Rendered uncompetitive in a global market economy
where low-wage nations were increasing their manufacturing outputs, many of
the industrial plants upon which traditional working class communities relied were
closed down, creating localized vortices of permanent recession and high
unemployment in which the presence of criminal markets grew quite alarmingly
(Taylor, 1999; Lea, 2002; Dorling, 2004). This was a period of ideological crisis in
which many individuals lost faith in the post-war social-democratic political class,
their own class-based communal identities and the State’s ability to represent
their interests. Many among the political elite, succumbing to the doctrines that
collectivism has unavoidable totalitarian tendencies and the market economy is
better when left to self-regulate, withdrew their support for the political
intervention and rights-based welfare that had become traditions in the post-war
era. There was a subsequent shift to a mixture of residual welfare, punishment
and micro-management of ‘risk’. Long chains of socio-economic interde-
pendencies—so vital to the maintenance of convivial relations because they
constitute the structure and dynamic interactions of everyday life in which
individuals learn to value and respect one another and the underlying platform for
real democratic politics outside of the State, whose wishes it is the State’s duty to
represent and implement (see Badiou, 2006; Rancière, 2007)—began to
disintegrate (Hall and Winlow, 2003). The era of social consensus politics was
well and truly over as the atomized individual was forced to take responsibility for
his or her own fate as an economic actor in competition with all others. Profound
shifts in cultural life followed and the intensification of Currie’s (1997) Darwinian
competitiveness (which could probably be more precisely termed Spencerian)
correlated tightly with increasing violence and criminality (Reiner, 2007) and a
general climate of augmented anxiety, aggression and punitiveness (Garland,
2001; Cavadino and Dignan, 2006). Barring the remarkable coincidence of a
number of disparate aetiological factors, all this seemed to be a direct result of
the shift from one capitalist model to another (Reiner, 2007).
In the 1980s, Britain also experienced numerous riots, strikes and political
protests alongside rises in crime and violence. In the late 1970s US and British
neo-liberals harboured the tacit expectation that increases in crime, violence and
social unrest—expressed openly and rather guilelessly in J.Q. Wilson’s (1975)
dour classical liberal revivalist tome Thinking about Crime—would inevitably
follow an economic transformation of such profundity, and that they could be
regulated by modified practices of classical criminal justice; increased deterrence,
prevention and risk-management administered by re-empowered agencies of law,
policing and punishment. This ‘tough’ approach combined uneasily with a
residual, rationalized welfare state. It challenged the sensibilities that some
proudly liberal individuals had cultivated over two centuries of life in what they
perceived to be a progressively more pacified and humane cultural environment
(although this was of course neither a uniform reality nor a dominant bourgeois
ideal—see Kearon, 2005). Neo-liberal thinking encountered resistance from the
liberal-left as it filtered into Anglo-American criminology and criminal justice policy
to demand increases in the certainty and, if need be, the severity of punishment
(see Wilson, 1975). Indeed, some neo-liberal supporters, perhaps tacitly mindful
of the residual conservative element of their intellectual tradition, which stressed
the positive relationship between social cohesion and civility (see Lasch, 1996),
sensed the potential dangers of allowing stable interdependencies to fall apart.
For instance, even the quintessential neo-liberal apologist Francis Fukuyama
(2000), in an effort to recover the credibility he lost when he prematurely
announced the ‘end of history’, eventually admitted that reducing the
interventionist power of the welfare state to throw the individual into the crucible
of atomized competitive individualism—which, of course, fans the flames of
anxiety, narcissism, acquisitive desire and anomie (Hallsworth, 2005; Messner
and Rosenfeld, 2007; Reiner, 2007; Hall et al., 2008)—might cause some
temporarily disruptive problems. Even so, he argued that forms of ‘social capital’
that were independent from political economy could be revived to replace social
democratic politics and revive social cohesion and civilized relations in the midst
of this disruption. Thus he effectively denied any sense of inevitability or direct
causality in the relationship between rising aggression and the move to
deregulated capitalism; admitting that, of course, for a highly fêted and
remunerated establishment mouthpiece, would have been going too far. This
perennial hope that things can be improved without any deep politico- economic
intervention had been echoed in suitably different terms by thinkers on the US
liberal-left, the ‘alternative establishment’, where Rawls (1971) continued to argue
that markets were inherently compatible with freedom and justice and Rorty
(1980) suggested in rather vague terms that ‘ethical’ and ‘sentimental’ checks
and balances might promote improved social relations in the heat of the
economic inferno.
Neo-liberal doctrine was less popular in Western Europe, but this is not to say
that European states remained unsullied by developments in the Anglo- Saxon
world. As the sale of former state-run enterprises by the Treuhandstalt in the
former GDR demonstrates, privatization did gain some degree of acceptance,
although this was far from universal. Hence, the common denominator in Western
European politics since the mid-1970s has been the variegated and cautious
importation of neo-liberal economic practices to counteract the possibility of deep
recession. At the same time, however, there was a concomitant increase in
homicide rates (Eisner, 2001), as well as increases in property crime and the
advance of criminal markets in commodities such as drugs, prostitution, stolen
goods and contraband, which tends to increase internal violence and homicide
rates among the increasing numbers of individuals involved in economic crimes
(see Woodiwiss, 2005). Therefore, the recent infiltration of what appear to be
socially toxic neo-liberal practices, although limited, still seems to have played a
part in precipitating slight rises in homicide rates, which we will now examine in
more detail.
Figure 3 European homicide rates per 100,000 of the population: 1875–1994 (by
interval)
Source: Eisner (2001: 629).
Comparisons of recent Western European homicide rates
Today, the British, Swedish and Finnish homicide rates are higher now than they
have been since the first half of the 18th century; Denmark’s and Switzerland’s
are higher than at any time since 1850–74; and Belgium’s is higher than in any
period dating back to 1900–24. What should not be forgotten here, however, is
that even though homicide rates in Western Europe have tended to rise, they are
still on average less than half of those found in the United States and the rises
are on a correspondingly smaller scale. This suggests that the stabilizing effects
of the residual social democratic model are still in evidence, minimizing increases
and in many cases maintaining national rates below 1.5 per 100,000 (see Figure
3).
In the early years of the 21st century Western European rates of criminal violence
(i.e. violence against the person, robbery and sexual offences) also remained
low, an average of just over 40 per 100,000 recorded by the police in 2001.
Across the Atlantic, the rate stood at 8.6 in Canada, but in the USA it was a
notable 310 per 100,000 of the population (United Nations, 2005: 36–7).
However, as we noted earlier, non-lethal violence is a contested category
susceptible to variations in culturo-legal definitions, sensibilities, reporting,
recording and litigation. Therefore it is rather unreliable in a cross-cultural context.
However, having said that, it would be stretching the imagination to suggest that
such a vast statistical difference does not represent anything less than a
significant difference in reality. If we return to the far more statistically reliable
homicide rate (see Figure 3), it has since the late 1960s followed a similar trend
to that of the USA, but on a smaller scale. This was especially true before the EU
was widened to incorporate 12 new Member States. For example, between the
years 1999 to 2001, the EU average homicide rate was 1.59 per 100,000
compared to 5.56 in the USA (Barclay et al., 2003: 10). Austria, Denmark,
Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden all stood below the average EU level,
whereas England and Wales,
Figure 4 Average homicide rate in cities per 100,000 of the population
between 1999–200 1
Source: Barclay et al. (2003: 11).
Northern Ireland, Scotland, Belgium, Finland and France were above average
(Barclay et al., 2003: 10), yet still nowhere near US levels.
The only countries in Europe that displayed homicide rates similar to or higher
than the USA were Estonia (10.61), Latvia (6.47), Lithuania (10.62) and Russia
(22.05) (Barclay et al., 2003: 10). However, at that time these four countries were
administered by fledgling post-communist states struggling to overcome the
Soviet legacy and adapt to an extremely abrupt transition to a free-market
economy. This transition, although portrayed by western neo-liberal ideologues
as necessary and unavoidable ‘shock therapy’, turned out to be, as Gerber and
Hout (1998) pithily observed, ‘more shock than therapy’. During this time the
State failed in all of these nations, and welfare rights and tenured employment
that had been instigated during the Soviet era were either drastically curtailed or
removed altogether. This created a climate of economic instability, social
disruption, intense competitive individualism and increased anxiety, which
correlated with the emergence of ‘gangsterized’ criminal markets in many
economic sectors and rising rates of violent crime and homicide (see Volkov,
1999).
National homicide rates are of course rather crude indicators, and rates vary
widely from city to city and locale to locale (Hagedorn and Rauch, 2004).
However, if we narrow our analysis for a moment and focus on homicides
recorded in cities by the police, the contrast between the EU and the USA does
not diminish but becomes even more apparent. In major EU cities between 1999
and 2001, there was an average of 2.28 completed homicides per 100,000 of the
population. Compared to these Western European cities, rates are much higher
in equivalent cities in the USA; for example, New York 8.65, San Francisco 8.10
(see Figure 4)1 and in Washington, DC an extraordinary off-the-scale 42.87.
Figures were slightly higher in Tallinn and Vilnius (9.40 and 8.90 respectively),
but a significantly higher 18.38 in Moscow. Thus rates in Western European cities
are much closer to their national averages, and the region does not seem to
suffer from the serious urban homicide problem that characterizes the USA and is
now beginning to appear in some British urban locales (Dorling, 2004).
Again, this reinforces the point that where the social democratic state is
minimal—either by conscious design and force of belief as in the USA, or as a
result of the ensuing chaos and neo-liberal ideological interference found in post-
communist states—homicide rates will tend to be higher than those in social
democratic nations with relatively stable economies and social relations, active
welfare regimes and the types of cultural values and norms that have constituted
and reproduced themselves in climates characterized by social cohesion and
economic stability. However, compared to this very tight correlation between
politico-economic forms and homicide rates, culture, as an autonomous or even
relatively autonomous force, seems to be a relatively weaker explanation for
homicide. If factors based on broader cultural differences are paramount, how is it
that Japan, for instance—noted for a uniquely cohesive cultural life that contrasts
starkly with the West—is now experiencing rises in hitherto very low crime and
homicide rates precisely at the same time as it is being pressured by global
economic forces into adopting neo-liberal economic policies and consumerist
cultural practices? On the other hand, why did the USA—with a cultural history of
violence, racial tension, competitive individualism and far less social cohesion—
experience significant decreases in its hitherto relatively high homicide rate
during the era of social democratic regulation? Furthermore, research on the
currently hot cultural issue of firearm use suggests that there is no consistent
connection between levels of gun ownership and homicide. The upshot of the
statistical picture seems to be that firearm homicide rates are high in countries
with high levels of gun ownership, high levels of general violence, unstable free-
market economies and minimal-punitive states, such as Russia, Colombia and
the USA, but low in countries with stable economies and regulatory social dem-
ocratic states whether they have high levels of gun ownership, such as Canada,
Austria, Belgium and Switzerland, or low levels, such as Britain and the
Netherlands (see Squires, 2000; United Nations, 2005). The same can be said
about the culture of ‘masculine honour’; how is it that homicide rates are high in
some southern states of the USA, where this cultural form is prevalent, yet low in
Italy and Germany, where it is also prevalent? Cultural factors are of course
vitally important (see Ferrell et al., 2004; Young, 2007), but it is perhaps unwise
to use configurations of these factors as a means of obscuring political economy
and pushing it into the background.
Conclusion
One brief article cannot definitively prove a broad hypothesis about a complex
phenomenon such as this. Further research is needed to examine whether our
contention that minimally regulated forms of neo-liberal capitalism invariably
generate the basic socio-cultural conditions that tend to increase homicide rates
holds water. However, this preliminary examination does demonstrate that
homicide rates fell continuously in Western Europe from various points in the
Early Modern period until the late 1960s, reaching their lowest points during the
relatively stable post-war social democratic era. It is quite possible that this was
accompanied by similar decreases in rates of serious non-lethal violence,
although the latter proposition needs a great deal of further research on issues
such as cultural sensibilities, definitions, penal codes and recording practices to
demonstrate whether correlations across time and space are sufficiently
consistent to suggest an aetiological relationship. As the post-war social
democratic consensus began to unravel, to be replaced by a neo-liberal
macroeconomic policy and a hyper-individualist consumer culture, homicide rates
began to rise slowly. Yet, nowhere in Western Europe are the homicide rates as
high as those of the USA. Here, despite the highest incarceration rate in the
industrialized West and a general expansion of the overall web of surveillance,
risk management and social control (see Cavadino and Dignan, 2006), it returned
to the obdurately higher national rate—with spectacularly higher rates in locales
characterized by permanent recession, deep social divisions and criminal
markets—that was the norm before its brief flirtation with a diluted form of social
democracy (see Figure 2).
A criminological re-investigation of the direct and durable generative effects of the
prevailing politico-economic form—rather than an exclusive focus on the cultural,
moral and regulatory processes that mediate, manage or ‘resist’ these effects—is
long overdue. A research agenda aimed at establishing this aetiological
relationship, while avoiding crude mechanistic claims of causality, would first
have to explore further the complexities of its empirical base by focusing on
regional and local breakdowns of homicide rates and variations in governance
across territories within nation- states. Differences in penal codes and police and
court recording practices are also important, and if the analysis is to be extended
to serious nonlethal violence, variations in conviction and sentencing practices,
cultural sensibilities, language and litigious tendencies would also require close
examination. Historical patterns would need to be compared carefully with spatial
variations, and of course the analysis would have to be extended to all regions of
the developing world where neo-liberalism is currently interfacing with various
cultural and political traditions. The rise of transnational crime and gangsterism in
a global neo-liberal economy is also a crucial factor. This is a huge amount of
work that would require international collaboration, but despite the enormity of the
task ahead, and the probability that work would be hampered by politically
inspired cut’n’paste criticisms of ‘economic reductionism’, ‘essentialism’ and so
on, the currently available data still suggest that there are indeed complex causal
relationships between the economic and socio-cultural conditions laid down by
neo-liberalism and relatively high rates of homicide.
We emphasize yet again the term politico-economic form, an everyday economic
way of life with distinct political governance, social relations and cultural
practices, not simply economic performance. Variations in performance also
correlate with variations in rates of crime, violence and homicide; in late 2008 a
leaked draft letter from the British Home Office admitted the inevitability of rising
rates in the midst of the current ‘market correction’, a revelation that was a little
later described by Home Office minister Tony McNulty as ‘a statement of the
blindingly obvious’ (BBC, 2008a). However, we contend that, despite the
recession, rising rates of crime and violence would be neither ‘inevitable’ nor
‘obvious’ if a regulatory, stabilizing form of political economy that acted as an
incubatory platform for new forms of social solidarity and cultural enrichment that
could cope with the disembedding, disengaging and divisive effects of ‘liquid
modernity’ (see Bauman, 2000) were to replace neo-liberalism, the quintessential
politico-economic generator of social division, anomie, narcissism and brutalizing
competitive individualism (Currie, 1997; Reiner, 2007; Hall et al., 2008). If this
preliminary hypothesis could be corroborated by further research, it might
contribute usefully to the broader intellectual challenge that must be made to the
current European acolytes of neo-liberal politico-economic policy. If Europe
moves closer to the Washington consensus model, will it—despite its contrasting
cultural and political traditions— see its homicide rates continue to climb,
accompanied by a US-style rise in incarceration that in some nations is already
underway (see Walmsley, 2005; Cavadino and Dignan, 2006)? Conversely, if the
Washington consensus model is firmly rejected worldwide and the European
model consolidates itself as part of a pluricentric and culturally sensitive global
network of social democratic states—not as an end in itself, but as a platform for
economic stability and more substantial progressive social change in the future—
will it lay the foundations for more egalitarian and culturally enriched societies in
which homicide and all other forms of serious interpersonal violence are less
prevalent?
In an era where the Washington consensus still dominates global economic
practice despite the current crisis, and the economic pressure exerted by
developing industrial-capitalist economies such as China and India continues to
increase, the EU appears to be in eclipse. On the other hand, recent events have
shown that the foundations of the current economic system might be more fragile
than had hitherto been imagined. Caused by an enormous asset price boom in
the American housing market, and unbridled speculation in the world’s financial
markets, the credit crunch has led to falling stock markets, failing banks and
increasing unemployment. Coupled with historically low interest rates, a frozen
interbank market and rising commodity prices, the spectre of ‘stagflation’ across
the globe suggests that in reality neo-liberalism is the system in deep trouble,
sustained only by institutionalized power and hegemony. Indeed, very recently,
Michele Barnier, agricultural minister in the allegedly ‘right-wing’ Sarkozy govern-
ment in France, remarked that vital needs such as food should not be left to
the ‘rule of the market and international speculation’ (BBC, 2008b). Even Gordon
Brown, arch-apologist for ‘light-touch’ regulation, conceded at the G20 Summit
on 2 April 2009 that the global economy faced difficulties, when he
euphemistically stated that ‘the old Washington consensus is over’ (Sky, 2009).
Nevertheless, Brown’s attempts to re-inflate the economy by the process of
‘quantitative easing’ have agitated many policymakers in Europe. The cut in VAT
and the increase in national debt have been described by Peer Steinbruck,
Germany’s finance minister, as ‘crass and breathtaking’ (BBC, 2008c). For the
French and Germans in particular, the Anglo-Saxon model of minimally regulated
capitalism needs to be redesigned with some urgency. Perhaps a growing
realization that the neo-liberal system is heading for the rocks might build upon
the recent rejections of the EU’s transparently neo-liberal draft constitution, which
indicate that the popular will to retain the ideal of ‘social Europe’ and forge a
more stable, egalitarian future based on updated variants of its core post-war
values has not been entirely vanquished. Variations in both crime and homicide
rates could play a vital part in the presentation of that argument.
Note
1. The US figures do not include those killed by the terrorist attacks of 9/11.
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